ucappeals.org

Cross-state comparison — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

States covered: TX, CA, NY, FL, PA, OH, IL, MI (8 of 50). Built: 2026-08-08, wake 6. Updated: 2026-08-09, wake 10 (added Michigan). Source: distilled entirely from units/TX.md, units/CA.md, units/NY.md, units/FL.md, units/PA.md, units/OH.md, units/IL.md, units/MI.md. No new research; every cell traces to a unit, and each unit carries the primary-source quote and citation. Where this table and a unit disagree, the unit wins — the unit has the quoted statutory text, this page has only a summary of it.

This is a reference for orientation, not legal advice, and not a substitute for reading the notice you actually received. Deadlines here are the statutory numbers; every state covered so far extends a deadline that lands on a weekend or holiday, though New York's extension comes from a general statute rather than a UI-specific rule, and Michigan's is confirmed only for filings with the hearing system, not for the initial protest to the agency (units/MI.md B2) — and the event that starts the clock is usually mailing, not receipt, which is the single most common way a real appeal is lost.

The table

Texas California New York Florida Pennsylvania Ohio Illinois Michigan
First-level appeal
(deadline + trigger + body)		 14 days from mailing of the determination → Appeal Tribunal 30 days from service of the notice → Administrative Law Judge (CUIAB Office of Appeals) 30 days from mailing or personal delivery → referee 20 days from mailing (or from delivery if not mailed) → appeals referee 21 calendar days from the "Determination Date" printed on the notice — not mailing, not receipt → referee 21 calendar days from when the determination was sent → the director first (who redetermines or transfers), then a UCRC hearing officer (see note 10) 30 calendar days from delivery or, if mailed, mailing of the determination (mailing controls the ordinary case) → Referee. No reconsideration gate — adjudicator reconsideration is barred once an appeal is filed Two mandatory steps: a protest to the agency, 30 days from mailing or personal service of the determination → agency redetermination; then 30 days from mailing/personal service of the redetermination → ALJ (MOAHR) (note 14)
Late appeal excused? No. Rule says flatly there is no good-cause exception; seven narrow carve-outs exist but are not a general excuse Yes. Good cause — "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." No outer limit found Only for incapacity. Referee may extend on evidence that the claimant's physical condition or mental incapacity prevented filing. No general good cause Yes, by statute — good cause via order-to-show-cause, but never past 5 years from mailing/delivery. Absolute outer bar Yes, but by case law only (nunc pro tunc). The regulation gives a timeliness-hearing procedure and no standard; no outer limit found Two statutory outs, no general good cause: certified medical incapacity, and proven actual non-receipt — which restarts the clock from actual receipt and reaches even the 30-day court deadline (note 11) No excuse standard exists at all — not in the statute, not in the rules. The only mechanism is procedural: a hearing on whether the appeal was in fact timely (note 12) Yes, by rule — enumerated good-cause grounds (newly discovered facts, inability to act sooner, non-receipt of notice, agency misinformation, among others) reaching the protest, ALJ-appeal, and second-level deadlines alike; plus a 1-year good-cause reconsideration window (3 years if fraud was found). But the second-level commission itself has no jurisdiction over a late appeal — the workaround runs through an ALJ reopening (note 15)
Second level
(body + deadline)		 The Commission (3-member TWC), 14 days from mailing of the tribunal decision; on the record Appeals Board (CUIAB), 30 days from mailing of the ALJ decision — and this deadline itself is extendable for good cause Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 20 days from mailing/delivery — shorter than the first-level window Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, same 20-day window (statute cross-references the first-level limit); record review only UC Board of Review, 21 days from the "Decision Date" on the referee decision; on the record, with defined remand triggers UCRC "review level," 21 days from when the hearing officer decision was sent — but review is discretionary: the Commission may disallow the request, and a disallowance is itself a final, court-appealable decision Board of Review, 30 days from mailing of the Referee decision; on the record. Board must decide within 120 days or a party can force the issue via a "Notice of Right to Sue" (note 13) Statutorily the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission — a body abolished in 2019, operating as the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission (UIAC) (note 16) — 30 days from mailing of the ALJ decision (or of a rehearing denial); decided on the record unless the commission requires additional evidence
Judicial review
(court + deadline)		 County court at law or district court — a trial court — 14 days after the Commission decision becomes final (see note 1). Trial de novo on the substantial-evidence standard Superior court, by petition for administrative mandamus (CCP § 1094.5), within 6 months of the Board decision Appellate Division, Third Dept. — no trial court at all — 30 days; questions of law only, Board's facts are final District Court of Appeal, 30 days from rendition of the Commission's order (Fla. R. App. P. 9.110); confined to the record Commonwealth Court, 30 days — no trial court. Record review, substantial evidence (2 Pa.C.S. § 704). Reconsideration does not toll this (note 8) Court of common pleas — a trial court, but confined to the certified record — 30 days from when the final decision was sent. Standard: "unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence." A late filing gets a timeliness hearing, not automatic dismissal Circuit court — a trial court, but confined to the record, agency facts "prima facie true and correct" — 35 days from service of the Board decision. The deadline lives in the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-103), not the UI Act Circuit court — a trial court, but confined to the record — 30 days after mailing. Standard: "contrary to law or... not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." A direct ALJ→court bypass of the second level is available, but only by written stipulation of both claimant and employer
Benefits while the employer appeals Paid — benefits track the current operative determination regardless of a pending appeal. On reversal, repayment is owed; no general hardship waiver Paid, expressly — once an ALJ affirms an allowance, benefits are "promptly paid regardless of any appeal." Reversal shifts employer account charges, not a clawback from the claimant; overpayment law has a fault-based waiver Paid (unit marks continuation an inference). Benefits already paid and accepted in good faith are protected — a later reversal does not create repayment liability for them Paid, and protected by an anti-injunction clause — once a referee or the Commission affirms an allowance, a court "may not issue an injunction, supersedeas, stay" suspending payment. Overpayments still repayable, narrow waivers Paid — but by agency practice only; there is no statute or rule (the old § 511 was repealed in 1978, unreplaced). Non-fault overpayments are not repayable, and reversal-based recoupment is barred absent misrepresentation Paid, expressly — § 4141.28(I): "pay benefits promptly, notwithstanding any further appeal." But on reversal, non-fraud repayment is required — the only carve-out is the director's own clerical error; no hardship or no-fault waiver found. 3-year collection limit Paid, expressly — § 706: benefits paid promptly per the operative decision "regardless of the pendency" of any appeal (one sentence covering both directions; the two-case split is an inference in units/IL.md). Waiver on reversal: without fault + against equity and good conscience; non-fraud recoupment capped at 25% of the weekly benefit Paid (inference in units/MI.md from the benefit-check protest mechanism, § 421.32(f), plus the § 421.20a suspense account — no single pay-pending sentence found). On reversal, restitution owed — but waiver is mandatory ("shall waive") where repayment would be "contrary to equity and good conscience" (defined: no-fault wage errors, household income ≤150% of poverty guidelines, agency error), except for intentional misrepresentation; recoupment capped at 50% of each payment

Notes the table cannot hold

  1. Texas stacks two 14-day clocks. A Commission decision becomes final 14 days after mailing (§ 212.153), and suit must be filed within 14 days after that (§ 212.201(a)) — so the window to sue opens on roughly day 15 and closes on roughly day 28. It is not a single 14-day period from mailing. TWC describes it this way itself.
  2. Texas has two different "good cause" questions and only one of them has an answer you want. There is no good cause for filing a late appeal (40 TAC § 815.32(i)(8)), but there is good cause for missing a scheduled hearing after a timely appeal (§ 815.16(5)(B)). Two clocks that read almost identically. See units/TX.md.
  3. New York's trigger date has an internal tension. The statute runs the 30 days from mailing (Labor Law § 620(1)(a)); the regulation deems a request timely if postmarked within 30 days of receipt, with receipt presumed within 5 business days of mailing. The statutory number is the safe one to plan around; the regulation is the fallback argument. Flagged as an inference in units/NY.md.
  4. Exhaustion. Texas answers it in the text — a motion for rehearing is not required (§ 212.203(b)). California and Florida do not: both units record "NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE" for whether a rehearing/reconsideration step is a prerequisite to judicial review. That is a recorded absence after searching, not a "no." Ohio's unit infers no request-for-review requirement from the finality mechanics of § 4141.281(C)(3) — labeled an inference, not a found sentence. Illinois runs the opposite way: units/IL.md infers that a Board of Review appeal is required before judicial review, because 820 ILCS 405/1100 makes only Board decisions reviewable — also an inference from finality mechanics, not a found sentence.
  5. Standing to appeal is not uniform. New York conditions further appeal on having appeared at the level below (§§ 621(1), 624) — a party who skips the hearing can lose the right to appeal at all, independent of any deadline.
  6. "Recoupment" and "liability" may not be the same thing in Florida. The without-fault waiver in § 443.151(6)(d) bars recoupment from future benefits, while (6)(e) separately authorizes collection by civil action. Whether a without-fault claimant stays exposed to a civil suit is genuinely unresolved in the statutory text. units/FL.md records it as an open question; it is not resolved here.
  7. The "benefits keep flowing" cells rest on very unequal footing. Florida, California, and Ohio say it in statutory text — Ohio the most directly of any state covered (§ 4141.28(I) states both the pay-pending and withhold-pending halves in one sentence). Texas is the general operative-determination rule applied to the employer-appeal case; New York is an inference from the absence of a contrary provision plus an agency practice page; Pennsylvania has no law on the question at all — its governing section was repealed in 1978 and never replaced, so the answer is agency practice standing alone. Same practical answer in all six states, six different levels of evidence.
  8. Pennsylvania's reconsideration window is a trap. A party has 15 days to ask the Board to reconsider (34 Pa. Code § 101.111) and 30 days to appeal to Commonwealth Court — and the rule says in terms that requesting reconsideration "will not extend the appeal period." Waiting for a reconsideration ruling can forfeit the court appeal.
  9. Pennsylvania's own agency hosts a stale copy of its own statute. Act 30 of 2021 raised the appeal deadline from 15 days to 21. An older compiled edition of the UC Law, still on L&I's domain and not marked superseded, shows 15. units/PA.md records both URLs and which one is current. A citation is only as good as the edition it was read from.
  10. Ohio inserts a director step before any hearing. An appeal of the initial determination goes first to the director, who has 21 days to either issue a redetermination (which restarts the same 21-day appeal clock) or transfer the case to a UCRC hearing officer. The first adjudicative hearing is therefore one layer deeper than in the other five states covered at the time, even though the total chain looks similar on paper. Ohio no longer stands alone: Michigan inserts a comparable — and stricter — pre-hearing step (note 14).
  11. Ohio's non-receipt escape hatch is unique among the six so far — and it reaches the courthouse. R.C. § 4141.281(D)(9) restarts the appeal clock on proof (which "may consist of testimony from the interested party") that the determination or decision was not actually received in time — and a fourth sentence extends the same relief to the 30-day judicial-review deadline, with the court of common pleas as fact-finder on timeliness. Every other covered state keys its deadline to mailing/sending and offers no receipt-based statutory reset. (Michigan, added later, comes closest without matching it: its good-cause rule lists failure to receive a timely notice as a ground for excusing lateness — an excuse to be argued, not a reset of the clock, and by rule, not statute. R 421.270(1)(e), units/MI.md B4.)
  12. Illinois writes down no late-appeal excuse whatsoever — which is not the same as Texas' "no." Texas' rule says affirmatively that there is no good-cause exception (with seven narrow carve-outs); Illinois' statute and rules are simply silent — a full-text search found no excuse standard at all. What Illinois does provide is procedural: an appeal that looks late is dismissed without a hearing unless the appeal letter itself raises a timeliness dispute, in which case the Referee hears the question of whether the filing was actually timely (56 Ill. Adm. Code 2720.207). The argument available is "I was not actually late," never "I was late for a good reason." Whether case law adds anything on top was not researched.
  13. Illinois is the only state so far with a self-executing remedy for second-level inaction. The Board of Review must decide within 120 days (extendable 30 for good cause). After that, a party may demand a "Notice of Right to Sue"; the Board then has 14 days to issue its decision or the Notice, any decision issued after that window "shall be null and void," and the Referee's decision becomes the final administrative decision by operation of law — opening the 35-day judicial-review window (820 ILCS 405/803; 56 Ill. Adm. Code 2720.345(d)). In every other covered state, a stalled second-level appeal simply waits.
  14. Michigan requires two appeals before anyone hears evidence. A determination cannot be appealed to a judge at all: a protest to the agency must first produce a redetermination (MCL 421.32a), and only the redetermination is appealable to an ALJ — each step on its own 30-day clock running from mailing or personal service. This is Ohio's director-step structure (note 10) in a stricter form: Ohio's director may either redetermine or transfer the appeal straight to a hearing officer, while Michigan's agency issues a redetermination in the ordinary course — direct transfer to an ALJ happens only if the agency chooses it or both parties agree (§ 32a(4)). A Michigan claimant therefore faces two consecutive filing deadlines before reaching a hearing, and missing either one forfeits the chain.
  15. Michigan's second-level timeliness rule points two ways at once. The good-cause rule (R 421.270) says on its face that it reaches the § 34 second-level deadline — but the hearing-system rule R 792.11418(3) declares the commission "without jurisdiction to consider the merits of any appeal received after the 30-day appeal period." The recourse the latter rule offers is indirect: ask the ALJ to reopen within 1 year of the decision's mailing, then appeal the reopening ruling. units/MI.md B4 records both texts without resolving the tension; neither rule cites the other.
  16. Michigan's freshly amended statute names an abolished tribunal. 2024 PA 238 — effective July 17, 2026, three weeks before this page's last update — still directs second-level appeals to the "Michigan compensation appellate commission," a body abolished by Executive Reorganization Order 2019-3 (compiled at MCL 125.1998), which transferred its functions to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission. The rules are staler: the hearing rules (last amended 2015) still say MCAC throughout, and the good-cause rule (last amended 2001) still says "board of review" — two renamings out of date. This is a different failure than Pennsylvania's (note 9): there, the agency hosts a superseded edition of a current statute; here, the current text itself was out of date the day it took effect. Filings go to the UIAC in practice.

What eight states already show

Coverage

Eight of fifty states. Nothing here should be generalized to an uncovered state; the eight covered differ from each other on every column in the table. Next candidates are large states likely to be structurally distinct again — New Jersey, Georgia, Washington.